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REINFORCING
THE SEAMS:
Guaranteeing the Promise of
California’s Landmark
Anti-Sweatshop Law
An Evaluation of Assembly Bill 633
Six Years Later

With contributions from Asian Law Caucus,
Garment Worker Center, and Women’s Employment Rights Clinic

MEMBERS OF THE GARMENT WORKERS COLLABORATIVE
ASIAN LAW CAUCUS
(ALC)

Founded in 1972, the mission of the Asian Law Caucus (ALC) is to promote,
advance and represent the legal and civil rights of Asian and Paciﬁc Islander
(API) communities. Integrating legal services with community education and
community organizing campaigns, the ALC strives to empower low-income
API community members to assert their rights and participate actively
in American society. Since the early 1990s, the ALC has played a key
leadership role in the improvement of garment workers’ conditions.
For more information visit www.asianlawcaucus.org or call 415-896-1701.
ALC, 939 Market St., Ste. 201, San Francisco, CA 94103.

ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN
LEGAL CENTER
(APALC)

The Asian Paciﬁc American Legal Center (APALC) is a nonproﬁt organization
in Los Angeles dedicated to advocating for civil rights, providing legal
services and education, and building coalitions to positively inﬂuence
and impact Asian Paciﬁc Americans and to create a more equitable and
harmonious society. APALC is the largest provider of direct legal services,
civil rights advocacy, community education, and impact litigation for lowincome Asian Paciﬁc Americans in the country. Since 1994, APALC’s
Workers’ Rights Project has served hundreds of Asian and Latino garment
workers and assisted them in recovering over 5 million dollars in unpaid
wages and in demanding changes to abusive corporate practices.
For more information visit www.apalc.org or call 213-977-7500.
APALC, 1145 Wilshire Blvd., 2nd Fl., Los Angeles, CA 90017.

GARMENT WORKER CENTER
(GWC)

The Garment Worker Center (GWC) is an independent non-proﬁt organization
dedicated to organizing Asian and Latino garment workers in Los Angeles.
The mission of the GWC is to empower garment workers in the Los Angeles
area and to work in solidarity with other low-wage immigrant workers and
disenfranchised communities in the struggle for social, economic and
environmental justice.
For more information visit www.garmentworkercenter.org or call 213-748-5866.
Garment Worker Center, 1250 So. Los Angeles St., Ste. 213, Los Angeles, CA
90015.

SWEATSHOP WATCH

Founded in 1995, Sweatshop Watch is a coalition of over 30 labor,
community, civil rights, immigrant rights, women’s, religious and student
organizations, and many individuals, committed to eliminating the
exploitation that occurs in sweatshops. Sweatshop Watch serves lowwage workers nationally and globally, with a focus on garment workers in
California. We believe that workers should earn a living wage in a safe,
decent work environment, and that those responsible for the exploitation of
sweatshop workers must be held accountable.
For more information visit www.sweatshopwatch.org or call 213-748-5945.
Sweatshop Watch, 1250 So. Los Angeles St., Ste. 214, Los Angeles, CA 90015.

WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT
RIGHTS CLINIC
(WERC)

The Women’s Employment Rights Clinic (WERC) is a clinical teaching
program at Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco. WERC
faculty and students advise, counsel and represent low-wage and immigrant
workers in employment-related matters, including individual and systemic
claims for wage and hour violations. WERC has been involved in legislative
and regulatory advocacy on AB 633, and has represented hundreds of
workers in wage and hour cases in court and administrative proceedings.
For more information visit www.ggu.edu/school_of_law or call 415-442-6647.
WERC, 536 Mission St., San Francisco, CA 94105-2968.
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With contributions from Asian Law Caucus,
Garment Worker Center, and Women’s Employment Rights Clinic
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(ALC), the Asian Paciﬁc American Legal Center (APALC), the Garment Worker Center (GWC), Sweatshop Watch, and the
Women’s Employment Rights Clinic of Golden Gate University School of Law (WERC). Together, we advocate for stronger labor
law enforcement in the garment industry and for manufacturer and retailer accountability for sweatshop conditions. We also
seek to empower low-income Asian and Latino garment workers to assert their workplace rights, and to ensure immigrant
workers have greater access to the government agencies charged with enforcing labor laws.
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During my ﬁrst term in the California State Assembly and as Chair of the Labor Committee,
I sought new solutions to the state’s most pressing labor problems. A top priority was addressing
sweatshop abuse in California’s multi-billion-dollar garment industry, where immigrant workers toil
long, hard hours-- often without receiving minimum wage or overtime. I worked with an unlikely
group of labor advocates, garment industry leaders, and retailers to reach a consensus about what was
needed. The result was the passage of the most signiﬁcant garment law in nearly two decades.

Assembly Bill 633 (AB 633), which was signed into law in September 1999, represented a huge
breakthrough for tens of thousands of workers in California. All sides worked successfully to craft
mechanisms to protect workers when a garment contractor goes under or refuses to pay. The bill
created a unique “wage guarantee” so that apparel companies would be held responsible, along with their contractors, for ensuring
workers get paid their legal wages.
AB 633 has been touted as the toughest law of its kind to address sweatshops in the garment industry. Since its passage, this
landmark law has successfully helped countless garment workers recover millions of dollars in owed wages. Better enforcement of
the law, however, is essential for AB 633 to fulﬁll its potential and ensure that garment workers are granted the most basic labor law
protections: minimum wage and overtime. As a leader in today’s global economy, California can and must make sweatshops history.

DARRELL STEINBERG
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hen California’s Assembly Bill 633
(AB 633)1 was signed into law in
September 1999, it held much promise
as the strongest anti-sweatshop bill
in the nation. AB 633’s enactment signaled an historic
consensus—among the state’s legislators, industry leaders,
and labor advocates — that something had to be done
about horrendous labor abuses in the garment industry,
and that those who proﬁt most from sweatshops should be
held responsible for eliminating them.
Before AB 633 was enacted, garment workers could not
seek their unpaid wages from apparel manufacturers and
retailers in wage claims before the state’s Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement (DLSE) — even when these
companies made their clothes in sweatshops. Workers
could only ﬁle claims against the sweatshops themselves,
which ignored the businesses that create and perpetuate
sweatshops in the ﬁrst place. Thus, prior to AB 633,
workers ﬁling wage claims were deprived of a remedy
when garment factories operating as sweatshops failed to
pay workers their wages and absconded. AB 633’s central
provision, its wage guarantee, aims to close this loophole
by requiring corporations to act responsibly and pay
workers what they are owed. Speciﬁcally, AB 633 sets up
an alternative mechanism apart from the court system —
an expedited administrative claims process culminating in
a hearing before DLSE — for garment workers to recover
an estimated $81 million in unpaid wages each year.2 As
part of this process, manufacturers and retailers are now
legally responsible as “guarantors” for ensuring, along with
the California garment factories they use to make their
clothes, that workers are not denied their most basic right
to receive minimum wage and overtime.
California has long held the unfortunate distinction of
being the garment sweatshop capital of the nation. Los
Angeles County alone produces approximately $13 billion
in clothing each year3 — at the expense of workers who
routinely toil under inhumane and illegal conditions. The
largest manufacturing employer in Los Angeles County,4
the garment industry is notorious for rampant workplace
abuses. According to the U.S. Department of Labor,
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nearly 70% of garment factories in Los Angeles fail to
pay federal minimum wage and overtime.5 Even though
only 6% of a garment’s retail cost goes to the worker who
made it,6 retailers and manufacturers continuously seek to
boost proﬁts by demanding lower and lower labor costs
and thus constantly depressing workers’ wages. As a result,
the average garment worker in Los Angeles made under
$10,600 in 2000,7 less than 77% of the poverty-level
income for a family of three in that year.8
The very structure of the garment industry is designed
to allow retailers and manufacturers to utilize and proﬁt
from low-wage, exploited labor — as they simultaneously
disavow responsibility for substandard working
conditions. Retailers sell brand name clothing directly
to the public and place orders with manufacturers to
produce their clothing. Manufacturers, in turn, typically
design garments, select fabrics, and seek out contractors
(garment factories) to provide the actual labor for apparel
production. Contractors operate at the mercy of retailers
and manufacturers, which pressure contractors to sew
garments for increasingly lower prices and use contractors
to avoid direct supervision of workers and (they hope)
direct responsibility for sweatshop conditions. Retailers
and manufacturers routinely fail to pay enough for the
production of their clothes to ensure that contractors
are able to pay minimum wage and overtime to garment
workers, who are mostly Latina and Asian immigrant
women. Many contractors, in turn, end up operating as
sweatshops.
Powerful apparel companies have long hoped that,
by engaging in multi-layered contractual schemes in
an attempt to distance themselves from the workers
who make their clothes, they could maximize proﬁts
while shielding themselves from legal responsibility for
sweatshop labor. AB 633 was intended to put an end to
this practice. With its wage guarantee, AB 633 explicitly
acknowledges the economic reality that large clothing
companies exert control over the working conditions
under which their garments are produced — and thus
should not escape liability when workers are deprived of
their hard-earned wages.

Six years ago, AB 633 provided hope that by penetrating
the industry’s subcontracting structure and mandating
corporate accountability through the wage claims process,
the state could play a more active role in improving
working conditions for garment workers. Since its
enactment, thousands of garment workers have used AB
633 to claim their unpaid wages, while labor advocates
have monitored AB 633’s implementation and pushed the
state labor agency to eﬀectively enforce the law. Indeed,
legislators, big business, workers, advocates, and the media
have all closely scrutinized how AB 633 has fared over the
years.
Today, AB 633 stands as a landmark law with great
potential — much of it yet to be realized — to ﬁght
against the proliferation of sweatshops and corporate
abuse in the garment industry, and to serve as model
legislation for other low-wage industries across California
and around the nation in which workers are denied their
most basic workplace rights. In documenting the successes
of AB 633, as well as presenting the challenges garment
workers still face in recovering their wages under the
law, this report seeks to provide an answer to the pivotal
question: Has AB 633 fulﬁlled its promise?
To answer this question, we analyzed a statistically
random sample of over 200 AB 633 claims docketed
by the state labor agency between March 31, 2001 and
February 18, 2004. Our Key Findings illustrate that AB
633 is a powerful tool that has been ineﬀectively utilized
by DLSE and hence ignored by many companies that
continue to proﬁt from sweatshop labor. This report
concludes with a series of recommendations which the
authors hope to pursue with key stakeholders as part of
our collective responsibility to realize the promise of
AB 633 —and to make sweatshops in garment and other
low-wage industries a part of our past, not our future. ■
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en years ago, the discovery in El Monte,
California, of 72 Thai garment workers forced
to work behind barbed wire and under armed
guard, while sewing brand-name labels for
many of the nation’s leading manufacturers and retailers,
ripped through the foundations of the garment industry
like a tumultuous fault line.9 The horror of the El Monte
slave sweatshop brought the message home: California is
the nation’s sweatshop capital, where Los Angeles County
alone produces approximately $13 billion in clothing each
year10— at the expense of garment workers who routinely
toil under inhumane and illegal conditions.
The largest manufacturing employer in Los Angeles
County,11 the garment industry has long been plagued
by rampant workplace abuses. According to the U.S.
Department of Labor, nearly 70% of garment factories
in Los Angeles fail to pay federal minimum wage and
overtime.12 California’s government agency charged
with enforcing workplace health and safety laws found
health and safety violations in nearly 100% of factories
inspected.13 A 2003 UCLA study found that three out
of every four garment factories cited by the Bureau of

Field Enforcement (BOFE), part of California’s Division
of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), violated
record-keeping requirements14 or failed to obtain a license
required to operate legally as a garment business in the
state.15 The report also found that the garment industry
was more likely than all other industries inspected by
BOFE to be cited for minimum wage and overtime
violations.16 Such statistics, and the deplorable conditions
of the El Monte case, belie the ﬁction that sweatshops are
isolated occurrences.
Today, apparel production remains one of California’s
principal industries, with Los Angeles the epicenter
of production in both the state and nation.17 The
garment industry continues to provide employment for a
signiﬁcant segment of California’s workers. As of April
2005, Los Angeles County counted 63,500 garment
workers,18 but there are likely thousands more employed
by factories that fail to register for a business license and/
or underpay payroll taxes.
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PYRAMID OF PROFIT AND POWER:
THE STRUCTURE OF THE GARMENT INDUSTRY
The very structure of the garment industry, both in
California and around the world, is designed to allow
apparel manufacturers and retailers to utilize and proﬁt
from low-wage, exploited labor — as they simultaneously
disavow responsibility for substandard wages and working
conditions.
At the top of the apparel pyramid sit retailers such
as Wal-Mart and Target that place orders with
manufacturers and sell brand-name clothing directly to
the public. Retailers reap the largest share of proﬁts and
impose the downward pressure on prices that is one of the
root causes of sweatshops.
At the second level are manufacturers, such as XOXO
and Dockers, that typically design garments, select fabrics,
create detailed speciﬁcations for apparel production, and
seek out contractors (garment factories) for the actual
assembly of their clothes. Some manufacturers sell their
clothing to big retail chains; other companies, such as
Forever 21, bebe, Charlotte Russe, the Gap, and Guess,
combine manufacturing and retailing operations and sell
their private label clothing directly to the public through
their own retail stores.

10 · REINFORCING THE SEAMS

Retailers and manufacturers pressure contractors, who
occupy the third level of the industry, to sew garments
for lower and lower prices. Competition among
contractors is ﬁerce and many open up and shut down
within a few months to a year. Contractors, mostly
immigrant entrepreneurs with little capital and often poor
knowledge of labor laws, operate at the mercy of retailers
and manufacturers, who dictate the styles, quantities,
turnaround times, and quality of garment production, as
well as the prices they will pay for contractors to do this
work. Retailers and manufacturers use contractors to
avoid direct supervision of workers and (they hope) direct
responsibility for sweatshop conditions — while they
routinely fail to pay enough for the production of their
clothes to ensure that contractors are able to pay workers
minimum wage and overtime. Many contractors, in turn,
end up operating as sweatshops.
At the very bottom of the pyramid — the greatest in
number and lowest in economic and political power — are
garment workers. They are mostly Latina and Asian
immigrant women, and they comprise the foundation of
the industry.19

California’s Garment Industry: Pyramid of Proﬁt and Power
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GARMENT WORK: LONG HOURS AT SUBSTANDARD PAY
In California, 2000 Census data indicated that garment workers earned $5.18 per hour at a time when the minimum
wage was $5.75.20 The Garment Worker Center, a non-proﬁt organization in downtown Los Angeles, found that among
the several hundred workers they assisted with AB 633 wage claims in 2001-2003, the average pay was eﬀectively $3.28
per hour, and the average work week was 52 hours.21 During a given week, month, or season, garment workers are often
required to work extensive overtime but are typically denied their overtime earnings; they may also be terminated from
employment without prior notice if work is slow. Workers are usually paid a piece rate of only a few cents per garment.
Even though only 6% of a garment’s retail cost goes to the workers who made it,22 retailers and manufacturers demand
increasingly lower labor costs and thus constantly depress workers’ wages in their quest for higher proﬁts. As a result, the
average garment worker in Los Angeles made under $10,600 in 2000, less than 77% of the poverty-level income for a
family of three in that year.23

THE PASSAGE OF AB 633:
THE TOUGHEST ANTI-SWEATSHOP LAW IN THE NATION
In the wake of El Monte and other highproﬁle sweatshop exposés, the public spotlight
illuminated the true nature of working conditions
in the garment industry and raised consumer
awareness about the need to hold retailers and
manufacturers legally responsible in order to
eradicate sweatshops.
Building upon this growing awareness, labor
advocates, including the Asian Law Caucus,
the Asian Paciﬁc American Legal Center, the
California Labor Federation, Sweatshop Watch,
and the Union of Needletrades, Textiles and
Industrial Employees (now UNITE HERE),
sponsored Assembly Bill 633 (AB 633), which state Assembly Member Darrell Steinberg introduced and state Senator
Tom Hayden co-authored, to clean up the industry. Apparel representatives came to the table with labor advocates and
engaged in intensive negotiations over the bill. As a culmination of these collective eﬀorts, Governor Gray Davis signed
AB 633 in September 1999. AB 633 became the law of this state on January 1, 2000.24
Applauding the unlikely group of labor advocates, garment industry leaders, and retailers who worked together to pass
the bill, Assembly Member Darrell Steinberg stated, “This agreement represents a huge breakthrough for thousands of
garment workers. All sides worked successfully to ﬁnd a solution that assures workers aren’t the losers when a garment
contractor goes under or refuses to pay.”
Rojana Cheunchujit, who was freed from the El Monte sweatshop in 1995, commented at the bill’s passage, “I once asked
my contractor employer why we got paid so little. She said it was because she did not receive much money from the
manufacturers. So that was the reason I would not get paid minimum wage. This law will help the many workers who are
not even getting paid minimum wage. It will make the manufacturers accountable.”
After decades of advocacy, labor advocates succeeded in enacting the strongest garment worker legislation in the nation.
(See Appendix A, “Key Provisions of Assembly Bill 633.”) ■
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This report is based on information from a number of
sources:
A random sample of AB 633 case ﬁles maintained
by DLSE. The random sample25 consisted of 208
AB 633 claims, or approximately 20%, of the 1044
AB 633 cases that had been docketed26 against the
ﬁrst defendant (usually the contractor) between
March 31, 2001 and February 18, 2004 in the DLSE
Los Angeles oﬃce, and that had been closed for all
defendants (both the contractor and guarantor(s)),
as indicated in data provided by DLSE on April 6,
2004.27 These ﬁles were provided to us by DLSE with
workers’ conﬁdential information redacted.28 The time
period analyzed in this report begins just after that
covered by a preliminary assessment of approximately
the ﬁrst 15 months of AB 633’s implementation, from
January 1, 2000 to March 26, 2001.29
Interviews with 10 DLSE staﬀ in the wage
enforcement, bureau of ﬁeld enforcement, legal, and
licensing units. Selected comments and proposals
from these DLSE staﬀ have been incorporated into
this report’s Key Findings and Key Recommendations.

The random sample includes 208 AB 633 claims ﬁled
against 160 garment contractors and 587 guarantors.
Multiple garment workers from the same factory may
each ﬁle individual AB 633 claims against their mutual
contractor and guarantor(s). These count as multiple
claims, but as one episode. Thus, one episode is equivalent
to either (a) a single claim ﬁled by one worker or (b)
multiple claims ﬁled by a group of workers against the
same contractor. In our random sample, there were 164
episodes.30
DLSE often consolidates multiple claims ﬁled against
the same defendant(s) in a single episode for purposes
of the AB 633 investigation, Settlement Conference,
Findings, and/or Hearing, etc. For example, DLSE
may issue one subpoena against a contractor requesting
payroll records for all workers who ﬁled AB 633 claims
in a single episode. Therefore, although data is available
for each individual claim, some data is more meaningful
if it is analyzed in terms of the number of episodes in
which certain characteristics or behaviors occur. In those
instances, this report refers to the number or percentage of
episodes. ■

Six case studies of AB 633 claims ﬁled by garment
workers, most of whom were represented by
organizations that collaborated on this report: the
Asian Law Caucus, the Asian Paciﬁc American
Legal Center, the Garment Worker Center, and the
Women’s Employment Rights Clinic.
Data from DLSE received in response to California
Public Record Act requests, as well as data that is
publicly available on DLSE’s website.
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OVERVIEW OF AB 633 CLAIMS PROCESS

I. GARMENT WORKER FILES CLAIM

DAY 1

■

Worker ﬁles claim with DLSE by ﬁlling out “Initial Report or Claim” form asking workers for basic
information about themselves, the contractor, their work hours and pay, and the amount of money
the worker claims to be owed.

■

Worker may also be asked to ﬁll out “Addendum to DLSE Form 1.” This form asks additional
questions speciﬁc to the garment industry, such as the labels and descriptions of the clothing the
worker sewed. It also asks about common workplace violations, including whether the contractor
punched workers’ timecards and paid in cash with no documentation or deductions.

■

Claim is soon docketed in DLSE case management system and a DLSE deputy is assigned to
manage and administer the claim.

II. INVESTIGATION

DAY 10 – 59

■

Within 10 days of receiving a claim, DLSE must send a “Notice of Claim and Meet and Confer
Conference” to the worker, the contractor, and any potential guarantors. The notice includes
basic information about the claim and notiﬁes all parties of the date of the Meet-and-Confer
conference (“Settlement Conference”), which should occur no later than 60 days after the date
DLSE received the claim.

■

A deputy from the AB 633 wage adjudication unit of DLSE (District deputy) issues subpoenas to
the contractor and potential guarantors for business records.

■

An investigator from DLSE’s Bureau of Field Enforcement (BOFE deputy) is assigned to the case.

■

The BOFE deputy interviews the worker and any witnesses, visits the contractor and inspects
business records, and attempts to contact and obtain business records from potential guarantors.

■

The BOFE deputy prepares a “Findings and Assessment” (“DLSE Findings”). DLSE Findings
state the results of the investigation, including an assessment of wages, damages, and penalties
owed and ﬁndings of guarantor liability.

III. MEET-AND-CONFER CONFERENCE
(“SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE”)

DAY 60

■

DLSE deputy managing the case convenes and oversees the Settlement Conference. The worker,
contractor, and all named guarantors are required to attend.

■

The BOFE deputy presents DLSE Findings to the parties.

■

The parties have the opportunity to settle the claim.

■

If the defendants do not attend or if a settlement is not reached, a formal hearing should be
scheduled within 30 days of the Settlement Conference.
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IV. HEARING

DAY 90 – 105

■

A DLSE hearing ofﬁcer presides over an administrative hearing.

■

All parties testify, present evidence, and/or witnesses, and have the opportunity to cross-examine
other parties. The BOFE deputy is asked to testify about her investigation, including a proposed
assessment of guarantor liability, but cannot testify about her assessment of wages, damages, and
penalties due.

V. ORDER, DECISION OR AWARD (“ORDER”)
■

VI. APPEAL
■

DAY 105 – 120

Within 15 days of the hearing, DLSE must issue a decision, or “Order, Decision, or Award”
(“Order”). The Order is a written determination that includes the award of any wages, damages,
and/or penalties found to be due from the contractor and/or guarantors. It also includes a
statement of facts, explanation of the law, and the reasoning behind the Order award.

DAY 120 – 130

Within 10 days after the Order is issued, any party may ﬁle an appeal with the California
Superior Court.

VII. JUDGMENT AND COLLECTIONS

DAY 130 AND ON

■

If the Order is not appealed or paid, DLSE sends a copy of the Order to the Superior Court.
The Superior Court then enters a judgment reﬂecting the amount of wages, damages, and
penalties awarded in the Order.

■

DLSE provides the worker with the option of attempting to collect the Judgment herself or
assigning it to the California Franchise Tax Board. If the worker is unable to collect her unpaid
wages from the contractor and/or guarantors, she may submit a claim for unpaid wages to the
state’s Garment Special Fund, which is funded by a portion of garment registration fees paid by
garment contractors and guarantors to operate their business legally in California.
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■ Since AB 633 became law, there has been a
sharp rise in the numbers of garment workers who
have ﬁled wage claims, but this increase still pales
in comparison to the tens of thousands of workers
who have been deprived of their wages.
AB 633 establishes an alternative mechanism apart from
the court system — an expedited administrative claims
process before DLSE — for garment workers to recover
their unpaid wages from companies responsible for
sweatshops. In recognition of rampant labor law violations
in the garment industry, the Legislature intended this
process to enable more and more workers to ﬁle claims
and seek redress for exploitative working conditions.
hen it was signed into law six years ago,
AB 633 was lauded as a model piece of
legislation signaling that California was
serious about addressing the root cause of sweatshops in
the garment industry. Since the bill’s passage, the state
labor agency has been entrusted with the vital task of
enforcing AB 633, and thus with the responsibility of
translating this historic law from paper into practice.
This evaluation is based on a statistical analysis of a
random sample of over 200 wage claims between March
31, 2001 and February 18, 2004.31 Our Key Findings
reveal that although AB 633 has helped some garment
workers reclaim their wages, DLSE’s implementation of
the law has fallen short of realizing AB 633’s promise.

This intention appears to have been realized. The number
of wage claims ﬁled by garment workers statewide, and
particularly in Los Angeles, has increased four-fold since
AB 633 became law.
Average annual number of wage claims ﬁled by
garment workers statewide:
● 1995-1998:
565 32
● 2001-2004: 2,282 33
Nonetheless, the number of garment workers who have
ﬁled claims represents only a tiny fraction of the tens of
thousands of garment workers — 70% of whom have been
denied minimum wage and overtime34 — who labor in
sweatshops and are covered by the protections of AB 633.
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■ Through AB 633’s wage guarantee, garment workers are starting to recover unpaid wages from companies
that use sweatshops. The overwhelming majority of these companies, however, still do not pay a single
penny to workers, who receive only a small portion of what they are owed.

In the time period covered by our evaluation, the average
amount garment workers recovered from contractors and
guarantors was over three times larger than the average
amount recovered during the ﬁrst 15 months of AB 633’s
implementation.35

Average Amount Received By Workers
from Contractors and/or Guarantors

AVERAGE AMOUNT RECOVERED PER WORKER
$1500

Our evaluation reveals that guarantors are paying
workers some portion of their unpaid wages,
predominantly as a result of Orders36 or settlements with
workers:
Guarantors paid almost 30% of the total amount
of money paid to workers.37 Before AB 633
became law, companies that used sweatshops
were not required to pay a cent of workers’
administrative wage claims.
Guarantors that paid workers as a result of an
Order paid 100% of the amount ordered against
them.38 This is in stark contrast to the ﬁrst 15
months of AB 633’s implementation, when
guarantors did not pay anything pursuant to an
Order.39
Over 25% of the guarantors entered into
settlements with workers.40 Almost 80% of the
wages that workers recovered from guarantors was
paid through settlements.

AVERAGE AMOUNT PAID BY GUARANTORS
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Average Amount Received By Workers
from Contractors and/or Guarantors

Before AB 633 was enacted, garment workers could not
seek unpaid wages from garment manufacturers and
retailers in wage claims before DLSE — even when these
companies made their clothes in sweatshops. Thus, prior
to AB 633, workers ﬁling wage claims were deprived of a
remedy when contractors operating as sweatshops failed
to pay workers their wages and absconded. AB 633’s
wage guarantee aims to close this loophole exploited by
companies that proﬁt from sweatshop labor. Garment
manufacturers and retailers are now legally responsible as
“guarantors” for ensuring, along with the contractors they
use to make their clothes, that workers are paid minimum
wage and overtime.

CASE STUDY:

The Wage Guarantee Pays Off
In January 2004, Maria Lopez,41 a Los Angeles garment worker represented by the Asian Paciﬁc American Legal
Center, ﬁled a claim for wages owed against the sweatshop contractor Pocket Fashion and the clothing companies
whose garments she made at the sweatshop, including Charlotte Russe (a private label retailer). Ms. Lopez typically
worked at the sweatshop 6 days a week, for up to 10.5 hours a day. She was forced to work “off-the-clock”: to
punch her time card well after she began working, and to punch out well before she stopped. She was paid by the
piece and not compensated for all the minimum wage and overtime she had earned.
At the hearing, Charlotte Russe claimed through its attorney that it was not a wage guarantor under AB 633.
However, written purchase orders submitted by Charlotte Russe itself belied its claim that it was not connected
to the sweatshop conditions at Pocket Fashion and instead demonstrated the company’s involvement in Pocket
Fashion’s manufacturing operations. Ms. Lopez argued to DLSE that these documents illustrated that Charlotte
Russe ordered the sweatshop to make thousands of garments for Charlotte Russe’s “Rampage” stores; that
Charlotte Russe communicated with the sweatshop regarding detailed instructions on how to make those garments,
including quantity, style, size, color, and ﬁt of each garment; and that she was then required to sew Charlotte Russe
clothing according to its speciﬁcations, while her most basic rights to receive minimum wage and overtime were
being violated.
In May 2005, DLSE issued an Order against Pocket Fashion and Charlotte Russe. DLSE found that Pocket Fashion
had engaged in numerous illegal practices, including denying Ms. Lopez minimum wage and overtime. DLSE also
found that Charlotte Russe was legally responsible for Ms. Lopez’s unpaid wages for the period of time she worked
on Charlotte Russe clothing. Charlotte Russe did not appeal the decision. Instead, the company paid 100% of the
amount it owed Ms. Lopez.
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Despite these indications that garment workers are
receiving some protection from the wage guarantee,
workers are still being deprived on average of two-thirds
of their wages owed.
Workers received from contractors and guarantors
only 31% of total wages claimed.42 This amount
does not include any damages, penalties, or
other payments to which they are also lawfully
entitled—and which typically more than double
their claim amount.
Only 15% of guarantors paid any money to
workers (as a result of an Order, settlement, or
judgment). 85% paid nothing.
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Guarantors paid on average only 11% of the
average wages claimed by workers.43
Even for the subset of workers whose claims were
fully adjudicated (i.e., an Order was issued in their
favor following an administrative hearing), 60%
of guarantors against which Orders were issued
did not pay a single penny owed to the worker.44
Moreover, DLSE collected on only three of the
12 judgments entered against guarantors after
they failed to pay Orders.45

CASE STUDY:

The Black Hole of Collections
For four years, Elena Rodriguez46 worked as a single needle sewing machine operator at K&S, a garment factory in
downtown Los Angeles. During this time she worked up to 58 hours a week and was never allowed to punch her
own time card, which was routinely falsiﬁed to reﬂect fewer hours than she actually worked. She was paid in cash
for the weeks when she was paid less than minimum wage.
After the hearing on her case, Ms. Rodriguez won an Order from DLSE totaling almost $20,000 in unpaid wages,
penalties, and damages. Nevertheless, the contractor paid absolutely nothing, even after a judgment was entered,
and Ms. Rodriguez was not provided any assistance with collections. In the end, she was left with nothing more
than a piece of paper.

❖❖❖❖❖
The fact that workers may pursue wage claims all the way through a hearing, only to be unable to collect on
a judgment in their favor, not only demoralizes workers but also undermines the purpose of the state’s labor
protections.
It is unclear why so many guarantors and contractors continue to ignore Orders and judgments, although the
fact that they are able to do so with relative impunity can only embolden predatory garment companies. Lowwage workers are ill-equipped to pursue collections on their own, and DLSE seldom pursues collections on
their behalf, despite DLSE’s legislative authority to do so.47 Instead, DLSE gives workers the option of referring
outstanding judgments to the California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) for collection efforts.48 However, FTB has
not actively pursued collection of judgments, including those from AB 633 wage claims.49 Furthermore, the
California Department of Industrial Relations (DIR), the agency that oversees DLSE, provides FTB with funds
to pay for the salary of only one employee assigned to process collections claims.50 As of February 2004, FTB
took an average of 18 months to process a collections claim.51 Moreover, once DIR refers claims to FTB, DIR
stops monitoring the claims and closes those cases in DIR’s database.52
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AVERAGE WAGES CLAIMED VS. SETTLEMENT AMOUNT
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■ Guarantors and contractors low-ball settlement amounts so workers recover on average only one-third of
wages owed, and DLSE lets some guarantors completely off the hook before all wages are paid.
The vast majority of claims are resolved through
settlements.

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%

However, contractors and guarantors pay settlement
amounts far below the wages owed to workers.

Over 75% of workers reached settlements
Workers who reached settlements with
53
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BY DLSEand/or guarantors received only 34%
the contractor IDENTIFIED
(including joint
settlements ) with
contractors
of total wages claimed.55
and/or one or more guarantors. Workers
recovered an average settlement of $1,772.
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contractors recovered
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with onewith
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less thanguarantors
31% of identified
total wages claimed from these
(including joint settlements), contractors settled
contractors.56
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in over 60% of claims. In these claims, contractors
guarantors identified
paid an average settlement of $1,589. Almost 99%
Workers who settled with guarantors recovered
of the money contractors paid to workers
was
only 16% of total wages claimed from these
60%
56%
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guarantors.57

30% When we examine settlement rates of guarantors
29%
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- MARCH 2001
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through settlements.

Settlements have the potential to improve the ability of
workers — who in many cases have been waiting years
to recover unpaid wages — to actually receive their wages
more quickly than if they proceeded to a hearing, where
outcomes are not certain.54 Settlements also oﬀer the
advantage of saving scarce time and resources of all parties
involved.
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Even when workers were still owed wages, 11%
of all guarantors were completely let oﬀ the hook
after the workers settled with the contractor and/
or the other guarantor(s).58 DLSE abandoned
the wage guarantee and did not give workers the
option to seek the balance of wages owed against
any remaining guarantor(s).

Settlements in which workers feel compelled to accept
such low amounts serve to undermine the purpose of
the wage guarantee. Contractors and guarantors have no
incentive to ensure that workers are paid their wages in
the ﬁrst place since they end up paying so little to resolve
claims.

CASE STUDY:

Taking the Low Road on Settlements
Laura Sanchez and Julia Mera,59 two workers not represented by an advocate, ﬁled AB 633 wage claims against
C&C Apparel Inc., a garment contractor. Both Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Mera routinely worked 11 hours a day, almost
non-stop — with at most only one 15-minute break daily. They were paid by the piece and forced to sign time
cards that did not accurately reﬂect all the hours they worked — or else they would not have been paid at all.
At the Settlement Conference, a DLSE deputy told Ms. Sanchez and Ms. Mera it was better to accept a small
settlement now than to continue to a hearing where they might not win anything. As a result, the workers reported
later to the Garment Worker Center that they felt pressured to accept a low settlement (just over 22% of wages
claimed by one worker and over 47% by the other). Furthermore, when the workers asked for a copy of the
settlement agreements they had signed, DLSE refused to give them a copy.

❖❖❖❖❖
Workers may be willing to accept settlement amounts that are only a fraction of what they are owed because
they urgently need the money to meet basic living expenses, and because they know that even if they win
their claim, it is very unlikely they will be paid pursuant to an Order or judgment. Many workers may also
feel pressured to accept low settlements recommended by DLSE, whose statements carry much authority
and power in the eyes of workers. Moreover, there is currently no procedure in place for DLSE deputies to
inform workers of their right to recover unpaid wages from the Garment Special Fund, which was created by
the Legislature precisely for the purpose of paying workers otherwise unable to collect the wages they are
owed.60 DLSE’s failure to inform workers of the existence of this fund may contribute to workers accepting low
settlements instead of continuing with a time-consuming claim that they believe will not improve their ability
to recover their wages.
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AVERAGE WAGES CLAIMED VS. SETTLEMENT AMOUNT
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CASE STUDIES:

Guarantors Ante Up When DLSE
Findings Raise Stakes
Between August 2003 and May 2004, 33 garment workers ﬁled AB 633 wage claims in San Francisco against
the garment contractor GNT, Inc. (GNT). The 33 claimants worked primarily as single needle seamstresses, but
performed other duties for GNT, including packaging, inspection, cleaning, cutting thread, and making samples.
Claimants regularly worked 9.5 hours a day, Monday through Saturday, with only one half-hour lunch break; some
also routinely worked on Sundays. Although each claimant worked overtime, none were paid for it, and several
were denied minimum wage.
At the Settlement Conference on their claims, the workers, represented by the Asian Law Caucus, obtained
approximately $145,000 in back wages from the ﬁve guarantors in their case: Jessica McClintock, Biscotti, Proﬁle
Design/Bellwether, Western Wear, and Shane Hunter. The guarantor settlements (in addition to approximately
$35,000 from another alleged guarantor, Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI), in a separate settlement with DLSE)
paid nearly 100% of the workers’ unpaid wages. The presentation of DLSE Findings at the Settlement Conference
sent a clear message to the guarantors regarding their legal liability, thus enhancing the workers’ ability to negotiate
favorable settlements with the guarantors.
❖❖❖❖❖
Juan Ramirez,68 a worker represented by the Garment Worker Center (GWC), ﬁled an AB 633 wage claim against a
garment contractor and numerous guarantors whose labels he had sewn at the factory. The worker furnished DLSE
with the labels but the correct legal entities of the manufacturers associated with the labels could not be discerned.
However, the BOFE investigator accessed the contractor’s garment registration information with the state, which
contained information indicating that JBL Cal Apparel, Inc. (JBL) was the primary guarantor. As a result, DLSE was
able to notify JBL of the claim and its potential liability.
After conducting an independent investigation of the facts, the BOFE deputy assessed liability against JBL in the
DLSE Findings. According to the DLSE Findings, the investigation revealed that there was “compelling evidence
of duplicate employee time cards being kept…[by the contractor].” Although JBL initially contested the worker’s
claim, JBL and the contractor jointly settled with the worker at the hearing for almost the entire amount in the DLSE
Findings. The worker received 100% of wages owed, in addition to payment for failure to provide breaks, plus
almost all of the damages assessed by DLSE.
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However, both the DLSE’s investigations and Findings
with respect to guarantors can be cursory and superﬁcial,
lacking the follow-through necessary to ensure that
workers are able to receive full protection from AB 633’s
wage guarantee. Many guarantors are either not pursued
seriously or dropped from claims without explanation.
DLSE failed to issue subpoenas for business
records to over 60% of guarantors. DLSE did not
have a standard practice of automatically sending
subpoenas to each guarantor identiﬁed, despite
the fact that such subpoenas are necessary to
conduct a proper investigation of the claim.
DLSE failed to conduct any investigation
whatsoever of 13% of guarantors that were
identiﬁed. It was unclear why no investigation
was conducted.

28 · REINFORCING THE SEAMS

In claims in which DLSE Findings were issued,
11% of the guarantors identiﬁed by workers
were not mentioned in DLSE Findings.69 It
was not apparent that an investigation of the
guarantors had ever been conducted, and no
reason was given for the omission. In addition,
7% of the guarantors were not mentioned
in DLSE Findings even though DLSE had
conducted some investigation of the guarantors
and there was no apparent reason why they were
subsequently released from the claims.
Our review of DLSE case ﬁles reveals a fundamental
problem: the complete lack of a paper trail on what
happens to many guarantors after they are identiﬁed.
We are left to surmise that guarantors slip through the
cracks because investigations are incomplete or shoddy,
and there is no documentation or explanation required to
justify the results.

CASE STUDIES:

When Guarantors Slip Through the Cracks
In wage claims ﬁled by 33 garment workers against the garment contractor GNT (see Case Study, page 27), the workers
provided evidence to DLSE that they sewed labels for Recreational Equipment, Inc. (REI). However, REI’s mere counter
assertion in a cover letter to DLSE that it had never placed garment orders directly with GNT was sufﬁcient to convince
DLSE that REI was not liable under AB 633 for the workers’ wages. Despite the fact that the company’s statement
was never investigated or independently veriﬁed by DLSE, DLSE dismissed the workers’ claims against REI without
notifying the workers’ representative, the Asian Law Caucus (ALC). REI was not even required to cooperate in the DLSE
investigation by providing some minimal explanation for how its garments were ordered for production at the sweatshop,
such as providing a list of companies that acted as purported intermediaries between REI and the sweatshop.
After the ALC and the Chinese Progressive Association helped the workers to organize and lead a successful corporate
accountability campaign (including a massive letter-writing campaign and rally) to publicly pressure REI to pay back
wages to the workers, REI not only agreed to provide a “grant” of $35,000 to assist the former GNT workers, but also a
list of California factories that REI uses to make its clothes. These signiﬁcant results achieved by the workers and their
advocates outside of the DLSE process highlight the critical information that should have been uncovered by DLSE as
part of a proper investigation — information that is readily available from companies but has not been systematically
sought by DLSE.
❖❖❖❖❖
In the spring and summer of 2001, hundreds of seamstresses — who had worked for several months in three
sweatshops in downtown San Francisco without receiving any pay whatsoever — were deprived of more than $1.4
million in unpaid wages and penalties when the sweatshops shut down and declared bankruptcy. This scenario was
precisely the type of situation contemplated by AB 633’s wage guarantee.
With the assistance of the Chinese Progressive Association, the Women’s Employment Rights Clinic at Golden Gate
University School of Law (WERC), and the Asian Law Caucus, the workers ﬁled AB 633 wage claims against the
sweatshops and alleged guarantors for which the workers made clothes (including bebe, Sam’s Club, Kmart, Mervyn’s,
Target, Nordstrom’s, JC Penney, Sears, and Cut Loose, among others). However, DLSE brought little pressure to bear
on the alleged guarantors and did not pursue AB 633 wage claims against them. Instead, DLSE utilized an alternative
mechanism under AB 633 to ﬁle a lawsuit in state court for wages, damages, and penalties against the individual
sweatshop owners and operators only, and failed to name a single guarantor.
As a result of the perseverance of the workers’ advocates, discussions are ongoing with several companies whose
garments were made at the sweatshops. However, to date, DLSE has not placed sufﬁcient resources into pursuing any
potential claims against the alleged guarantors — despite the fact that the state court judge issued a tentative decision
ﬁnding that the workers are owed over $1.4 million in unpaid wages and penalties.
❖❖❖❖❖
As a counterpoint to the above examples of DLSE’s failure to properly investigate and pursue guarantors, the recent
claim brought by Maria Lopez70 in Los Angeles against the private label retailer Charlotte Russe (see Case Study,
page 21) showcases what can be achieved when DLSE does what AB 633 requires — investigates the actual
business practices of the potential guarantor, instead of relying upon the superﬁcial assertions of the company.
Despite repeated declarations by Charlotte Russe’s attorney that the company was not a wage guarantor, the DLSE
hearing ofﬁcer ruled otherwise after evaluating the facts of the case. As this case demonstrates, even if a company
claims that it is not responsible for a worker’s unpaid wages, DLSE should ensure it is mandatory practice — not a
rare occurrence — to examine the actual business practices of the entity in question and require, at a minimum,
that the company provide any information in its possession that might assist DLSE to assess the facts and identify
the appropriate guarantors.
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■ Guarantors and contractors frequently fail to turn
over business records, and half the time DLSE does
not require guarantors to produce any records at
all.
AB 633 mandates that within 10 days after a claim is
ﬁled, DLSE must issue a subpoena for the contractor’s
business records — including employee payroll records
and records of the contractor’s business relationship
with guarantors.71 One of the primary purposes of the
subpoena is to enable DSLE to identify guarantors, as
well as collect proof of minimum wage and overtime
violations. Without these records, it is diﬃcult — and
sometimes impossible — to identify wage guarantors and
pursue claims against them. That is precisely why AB 633
explicitly includes strict record-keeping requirements,
including the power of DLSE to demand inspection of
records and seek sanctions for failure to comply with these
requirements.

Guarantors exhibited similarly low compliance rates
in response to DLSE subpoenas, which were issued to
guarantors much less frequently than to contractors,
despite the fact that business records from guarantors are
central to conducting a proper investigation of the claim.
DLSE issued subpoenas to guarantors in
less than 50% of episodes, and failed to issue
subpoenas to over 60% of guarantors.77
Only 54% of the guarantors to which subpoenas
were issued provided any documents in response.
To the best of our knowledge, of the guarantors
that provided documents, only 9% of these
guarantors provided copies of written contracts
with contractors.78

■ Sanctions for record-keeping violations are not
pursued by DLSE, thus undercutting DLSE’s power
and responsibility to investigate guarantors and
enforce the wage guarantee.

Two other key mechanisms are designed to buttress
DLSE’s investigative power and provide eﬀective means
to identify guarantors and determine their share of
liability: 1) contractors and guarantors are required to
maintain written contracts of their business relationship
with each other;72 and 2) on the itemized deduction
statements that must be provided to workers each pay
period, contractors are required to list the names of
guarantors for which the contractor made clothes during
the pay period.73

DLSE has the ability to seek various sanctions for failure
to comply with subpoenas and maintain required records,
including the power to revoke garment registration
licenses that are a necessary condition of operating a
garment business in the state.79 However, DLSE does not
seek sanctions against contractors that fail to comply with
key record-keeping requirements.

Despite these requirements, contractors in case after case
do not turn over written records related to the guarantors
with which they do business. They also frequently fail to
comply with DLSE subpoenas and routinely produce
incomplete payroll records at best.74

DLSE revoked the garment registration license of
only one contractor in only one episode of the 81
episodes in which contractors either provided no
business records or incomplete records in response
to a subpoena.

Although DLSE issued subpoenas for business
records to contractors in almost 85% of episodes,
contractors failed to provide any documents 18%
of the time, and provided documents only 52%
of the time.75 When contractors did provide
documents, they were incomplete almost 90% of
the time.

In other words, there was a less than 1% chance
that a contractor’s registration would be revoked
if it failed to provide necessary business records to
DLSE.

To the best of our knowledge, not one contractor
submitted copies of written contracts with
guarantors. Furthermore, there were no itemized
wage deduction statements listing guarantor
names in any of the case ﬁles we examined.76
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DLSE’s failure to utilize available sanctions allows
contractors and guarantors to continue ﬂouting the law
without any repercussions.
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■ DLSE takes almost twice as long to adjudicate
wage claims than is allowed under AB 633’s
expedited timeline.
AB 633 mandates that DLSE must fully adjudicate
a wage claim (i.e., reach a ﬁnal disposition against all
defendants involved) within 120 days from the date
DLSE receives the claim. DLSE has not met AB 633’s
expedited timeline.
On average, it took almost 200 days to adjudicate
an AB 633 claim. This ﬁgure is especially
problematic given the fact that the vast of
majority of claims were resolved short of a
Settlement Conference or hearing.80
The longer that garment workers have to wait for the
resolution of their claims, the harder it is for them to
meet basic subsistence needs. Each day that their claim
remains unresolved places a disproportionate burden on
garment workers who are deprived of minimum wage and
overtime. Furthermore, the longer it takes to adjudicate
a claim, the more time contractors have to shut down
their operations and disappear — often making it much
more diﬃcult for workers to prove their cases. AB 633’s
expedited timeline should be the rule, not the exception,
for all low-wage workers who ﬁle wage claims at DLSE.

■ DLSE appears to be understaffed relative to the
number of workplaces it regulates, but it is unclear
why the self-funding mechanism of AB 633 would
not provide sufﬁcient resources for DLSE to fully
enforce the law.
As of March 2005, the ratio of registered garment
businesses to the total number of DLSE employees was
over 13 to 1. This does not even account for companies
that operate unregistered, let alone businesses in other
low-wage industries which DLSE is responsible for
inspecting. All DLSE staﬀ who were interviewed
mentioned that insuﬃcient numbers of staﬀ combined
with a heavy caseload hampered their ability to enforce
AB 633.
The California Legislature intended AB 633’s garment
registration fees to generate enough funds to implement
and enforce the law.81 Between October 2002 and May
2005, DLSE received $10,158,975 in garment registration
fees.82 It is unclear how this funding has been spent to
date.83 ■
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ROBERT GUMPERT

DLSE STAFFING LEVELS VS. CALIFORNIA GARMENT WORKPLACES
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ur Key Findings indicate that although AB
633 can be a potent tool for workers who are
seeking their unpaid wages, DLSE has failed
to fully enforce AB 633’s provisions and thus
many companies responsible for sweatshops continue to
ignore the law. The following Key Recommendations84
should be implemented by DLSE to ensure that AB 633
lives up to its original intent and that basic labor standards
are a guarantee, not an illusion, for our state’s garment
workers:
Enable workers to recover the full amount of their
unpaid wages, as well as the penalties and damages
they are owed under the law.
Improve the identiﬁcation and investigation of
guarantors.
Assess sanctions against garment contractors and
guarantors that fail to comply with record-keeping
requirements.
Report regularly to the Legislature and the public
on DLSE’s expenditures and activities related to
AB 633, and implement DLSE quality control
mechanisms.
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ENABLE WORKERS TO RECOVER THE FULL AMOUNT OF
THEIR UNPAID WAGES, AS WELL AS THE PENALTIES AND
DAMAGES THEY ARE OWED UNDER THE LAW
For the ﬁrst time in administrative wage claims, garment
workers are able to seek redress from companies that use
sweatshop labor. Guarantors are paying workers, who
are receiving some protection from the wage guarantee.
However, the core purpose of the wage guarantee is
undermined when workers recover only a fraction — less
than one-third — of the total amount of their unpaid
wages. Furthermore, workers are not recovering damages
and penalties which usually more than double their claim
amount, and which are designed to deter future workplace
violations. Contractors and guarantors have no incentive
to ensure that workers are paid their wages in the ﬁrst place
when they end up paying so little to resolve wage claims.
Two of our Key Findings in particular reveal serious
problems with DLSE’s enforcement of the wage guarantee.
First, not only are guarantors generally settling claims for
an extremely small portion (less than one-sixth) of workers’
wages, but DLSE lets one out of every ten guarantors oﬀ
the hook after workers settle with the contractor and/or
the other guarantor(s) — even when workers are still owed
wages. In these cases, DLSE abandons the wage guarantee
by not providing workers with the option to seek the
balance of wages owed against the remaining guarantor(s).
Second, even workers who prevail at a full administrative
hearing are often unable to recover their wages. DLSE
Orders are ﬂagrantly disregarded by contractors and
guarantors alike. Three out of every ﬁve guarantors and 18
out of 19 contractors against which Orders were issued did
not pay a single penny owed to the worker, and DLSE did
not enforce judgments entered after Orders were not paid.
Without judgment collection, garment companies will
continue to view the administrative claims process as little
more than an inconvenience, with no serious consequences
attached to ﬂouting DLSE’s authority. Workers who spend
time they cannot aﬀord to waste and who take many risks
to pursue claims may win a judgment that is a mere paper
tiger. This kind of hollow result reduces AB 633 to little
more than an empty promise.
If DLSE were to actively pursue judgment collection, we
project two interrelated positive outcomes: 1) contractors
and guarantors would take the claims process more
seriously; and 2) workers’ ability to recover their wages,

as well as damages and penalties — either through
settlements, Orders, or judgments — would improve
because workers would have more incentive not to settle
up-front for such a small fraction of what they are owed.
DLSE must take the following steps so that workers have
a meaningful opportunity to recover their unpaid wages, as
well as attendant damages and penalties:
If a worker settles with a contractor and/or one or
more guarantors for an amount less than wages
owed, DLSE should automatically continue the
claim against the remaining guarantor(s) to recover
the balance of wages owed instead of terminating
the case, unless the worker is fully informed of
his/her right to proceed with the claim against all
remaining guarantors but consents in writing to
waive that right.
DLSE should ensure that workers (particularly
those who are not represented by an advocate)
understand that they are not required or being
encouraged by DLSE to settle their claims for only
a fraction of their wages, and that they are legally
entitled to damages and penalties.
DLSE should inform workers about the
possibility of recovering their unpaid wages from
the Garment Special Fund, including providing
written notice in each worker’s primary language
about the procedure and requirements for applying
to the Fund.
DLSE must make collections a priority by
enforcing judgments on behalf of workers85 either
in-house or through an eﬀective arrangement
with the Franchise Tax Board or appropriate state
agency. DLSE should also exercise its authority to
assess penalties against contractors and guarantors
that do not pay outstanding judgments.86
In addition, DLSE’s implementation of the following three
categories of Key Recommendations will also enhance
workers’ ability to receive full protection from AB 633’s
wage guarantee.
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IMPROVE THE IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF
GUARANTORS
Although workers have received some protection from
the wage guarantee, guarantors are still able to evade
responsibility when DLSE fails to consistently identify and
investigate guarantors. Our Key Findings reveal that half
the time, the burden of identifying potential guarantors
falls on workers. Even though workers are one reliable
source of information on guarantors, not all workers are
aware of the identity of guarantors (for example, some
may not sew labels into clothing or are unable to read the
labels). DLSE has neglected its responsibility to utilize
investigative resources and powerful means of guarantor
identiﬁcation at its disposal – including the authority to
require contractors and guarantors to maintain and turn
over business records.
Furthermore, DLSE does not routinely conduct a thorough
and proper investigation of all potential guarantors
identiﬁed in wage claims. Several troubling questions raised
by our Key Findings include:
why some guarantors are not investigated at all,
even after they are initially identiﬁed by workers;
why subpoenas are issued against guarantors less
than 50% of the time; and
why some guarantors appear to be investigated but
are subsequently dropped from DLSE Findings for
no apparent reason.
Particularly problematic is anecdotal evidence from our
case studies that may illuminate why some guarantors
disappear from claims: in some cases, DLSE has relied
upon the superﬁcial assertions of a company that it has no
business relations with the sweatshop, without requiring
the company to provide any information explaining how its
clothes were ordered for production at the sweatshop.
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In order for the wage guarantee to hold any meaning,
DLSE must consistently examine the actual business
practices of potential guarantors through eﬀective
identiﬁcation procedures and adequate investigations, as
follows:
DLSE MUST TAKE MEANINGFUL STEPS TO IDENTIFY
GUARANTORS IN ADDITION TO WORKERS’ INITIAL
IDENTIFICATION OF GUARANTORS.
DLSE should enforce current law requiring
contractors to list on workers’ itemized wage
deduction statements the names of guarantors for
which they made clothes during the pay period.87
DLSE should enforce current law requiring
contractors and guarantors to keep written
contracts with each other, documenting
information about price, quantity, style of garments
to be produced, and the length of time in which
the garments must be manufactured.88
DLSE deputies and BOFE deputies should
routinely request copies of garment registration
applications and renewals of the contractor and
guarantor(s) immediately after a worker ﬁles an
AB 633 claim, and not on a discretionary basis.
The current application for garment registration
asks applicants to list the garment companies
with which they do business, and are therefore a
potential source for identifying guarantors.
To facilitate DLSE investigators’ ability to identify
guarantors and share information about guarantors,
DLSE should set up a computerized master list
of all guarantors included on contractors’ garment
registration applications and named in AB 633
wage claims, including business name and address,
agent for service of process, and any associated
labels identiﬁed in the wage claims. Tracking
label names (which are often diﬀerent from the
company’s legal name) will enable DLSE to
identify and investigate guarantors more eﬃciently
in the future. DLSE could simply add this data to
the garment registration database that is publicly
available on DLSE’s website.89

DLSE MUST CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATIONS OF
GUARANTORS.
DLSE should make it a consistent practice to issue
a subpoena for records against all guarantors and
contractors.
DLSE should establish clear guidelines for
investigating guarantors, including the routine use
of investigative checklists, forms, and questions
(regarding, e.g., how to properly determine guarantor
liability in the absence of records), as well as
implement training and quality control mechanisms
to ensure that DLSE staﬀ follow these guidelines.
In response to a subpoena for records, a company
that claims it is not a guarantor should be required,
at minimum, to provide DLSE with an aﬃdavit
aﬃrming: a diligent search and reasonable inquiry
have been made in an eﬀort to comply with the
demand; whether the inability to produce records
is because a particular record has never existed, has
been destroyed, or is no longer in the company’s
possession or control; the names and addresses of
any and all businesses known or believed by that
company to have possession, custody, or control of
the record not produced, including those businesses
the company contracted with during the claim
period so that DLSE can identify the relevant
guarantor(s); and any and all information the
company has about how its garments were ordered
for production at the garment contractor at issue.90
Companies that fail to submit such an aﬃdavit
should not be dismissed from the claim; instead,
such failure should trigger the legal presumption
that a worker’s competent testimony as to guarantor
liability prevails in DLSE Findings and at the
hearing.
DLSE should give no weight to representations of
fact regarding the business practices of a guarantor
made by the guarantor’s attorney at the Settlement
Conference or hearing. DLSE should assess the
facts based on bona ﬁde business records submitted
by the guarantor; if none are provided, DLSE
should enforce the legal presumption that a worker’s
competent testimony as to guarantor liability
prevails.91

ASSESS SANCTIONS
AGAINST GARMENT
CONTRACTORS AND
GUARANTORS THAT FAIL
TO COMPLY WITH RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS
Because shoddy or non-existent record-keeping enables
sweatshops to conceal wage and hour violations and
guarantors to hide their connection to sweatshop labor,
AB 633 mandates that guarantors and contractors must
keep and turn over written business records. These records
are central to DLSE’s ability to identify guarantors,
adequately investigate a claim, and determine wages owed.
Precisely for these reasons, record-keeping requirements
are routinely ignored by contractors and guarantors
attempting to avoid liability under the law.
DLSE currently possesses useful tools to enforce key
record-keeping requirements. However, DLSE rarely, if
ever, utilizes these tools. Without real repercussions for
non-compliance with record-keeping laws, sweatshops
will continue to operate illegally and oﬀ the books, and
guarantors will remain invisible while they continue to
proﬁt from sweatshop labor.
DLSE must put real muscle behind record-keeping
requirements that are integral to enforcing the wage
guarantee, by implementing the following:
ASSESS MONETARY PENALTIES AND DAMAGES
DLSE should exercise its authority to assess
monetary penalties when, in response to a
subpoena for records, a garment contractor claims
it does not possess employee payroll records
and/or written contracts indicating the price
per unit agreed to between the contractor and
guarantor(s).92
DLSE should exercise its authority to assess
monetary damages against guarantors that in
bad faith refuse to produce records or otherwise
cooperate with a DLSE investigation.93
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REVOKE GARMENT REGISTRATION LICENSES
DLSE should exercise its authority to revoke a
contractor’s or guarantor’s garment registration if
the contractor or guarantor fails to maintain and/or
produce written contracts for inspection during a
DLSE investigation.94
DLSE should exercise its authority to revoke a
contractor’s garment registration if it fails to comply
with a subpoena for records,95 or fails to include
guarantor names on wage deduction statements.96

DENY INCOMPLETE GARMENT REGISTRATION
APPLICATIONS
DLSE should refuse to issue a garment registration
license unless the registration application is
completed in full. The current application for
registration asks applicants to list the garment
companies with which they do business. Often, this
section of the application is left blank, but a license
is issued nonetheless.

REPORT REGULARLY TO THE LEGISLATURE AND THE PUBLIC
ON DLSE’S EXPENDITURES AND ACTIVITIES RELATED
TO AB 633, AND IMPLEMENT DLSE QUALITY CONTROL
MECHANISMS
DLSE PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
It is imperative that DLSE leverage its resources to
maximize enforcement of AB 633 as the Legislature
intended when it enacted this landmark law. Full
transparency and public accountability will help DLSE
reach this goal.
The authors of this report call on DLSE to immediately
prepare a report documenting its actual expenditures
for AB 633, as well as how the agency spends the funds
allocated for the administration of AB 633. DLSE
should present this report to the Legislature at a public
hearing. If DLSE believes that more resources are
necessary to fully implement the law, it should provide a
detailed explanation, including an analysis of any staﬃng
deﬁciencies. Furthermore, DLSE should regularly report
to the Legislature on its expenditures and activities related
to AB 633.
Moreover, AB 633’s ﬁnal regulations authorize DLSE
to distribute publications about industry practices and
patterns of violations.97 Since October 2002, DLSE has
issued only 2 such publications.
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DLSE should immediately issue an updated publication
about common industry practices and violations. This
information would be helpful in DLSE’s assessment of
how to most eﬀectively allocate its resources.
DLSE INTERNAL TRAINING AND QUALITY CONTROL
DLSE should institute regular comprehensive trainings
for DLSE personnel who work on AB 633 claims (such
as BOFE deputies, DLSE deputies, and AB 633 hearing
oﬃcers). Internal quality control mechanisms will help
ensure that the law is fully enforced and that workers are
able to recover what they are owed. ■
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nvesting in the well-being of California’s lowwage workforce — by requiring corporations to
act responsibly and to pay workers what they are
owed — is critical to the long-term vitality of
our state. Six years ago, the Legislature passed AB 633
in recognition of this fact. The bill’s goal was simple: to
guarantee basic labor protections in an industry notorious
for forcing workers to toil in abysmal conditions — far
below the bare minimum standards required by law.
This report illustrates how AB 633 can be a powerful tool
for workers to recover their wages and hold corporations
accountable. But poor implementation of AB 633 by
DLSE and ﬂagrant disregard of the law by many apparel
companies eﬀectively strip AB 633 of its power. Policy
makers and labor agency oﬃcials must play an active role
in addressing these challenges so that AB 633 operates
as a potent law not only on paper, but also in practice. In
this era of economic globalization, we share a common
responsibility to nurture an economy that is vibrant and
productive; corporations must be required to do their
part to promote fair standards for living and working in
this state. With proper enforcement of AB 633, we take
critical steps in the right direction towards building a
more just and healthy California. ■

REINFORCING THE SEAMS · 37

APPENDIX A

KEY PROVISIONS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 633
The cornerstone provisions of AB 633, which took effect on January 1, 2000, include the following:

NEW WAGE GUARANTEE
➛ Manufacturers and retailers that contract to have garment manufacturing operations performed (“guarantors”) are liable for
their garment contractors’ violation of minimum wage and overtime laws.98

EXPEDITED CLAIMS PROCESS
➛ An expedited administrative process at DLSE of no longer than 120 days for garment workers to have their wage claims
adjudicated.99

STRENGTHENED RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENTS
➛ Requirement that garment contractors and guarantors maintain certain records, including written contracts with detailed

information about the contract terms and conditions. These records must be maintained for four years and made available to
DLSE for inspection and copying, as a condition of garment registration and renewal.100

➛ Requirement that DLSE issue a subpoena to garment contractors for books and records within 10 days of receiving an AB

633 claim, and requirement that garment contractors provide complete and accurate records within 10 days of receiving the
subpoena as a condition of continued garment registration.101

➛ Requirement that as a condition of continued registration, contractors provide workers with information about the guarantors
for which they are producing clothes, on the workers’ itemized wage deduction statements.102

FUNDING FOR STATE ENFORCEMENT
➛ Increased registration fees for contractors and guarantors that operate their business in California, in order to fully fund

enforcement of AB 633 as well as contribute to the state’s Garment Special Fund, which covers unpaid wages for workers
unable to collect on a judgment in their favor.103

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR CONTRACTORS
➛ Establishment of successor liability so that garment contractors cannot shut down and subsequently re-open under a diﬀerent
name to avoid paying the wages of their former workers.104
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APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Following are supporting tables and data for selected Key Findings.
RANDOM SAMPLE
Our evaluation includes data from a random sample of 208 AB 633 claims ﬁled by garment workers in Los Angeles.
Year Claim Filed
# of AB 633 Claims (in Random Sample)

2000105

2001

2002

2003

2004106

4

73

70

61

0

MULTIPLE CLAIMANT EPISODES
Fifty-ﬁve (33.5%) of the 164 episodes (against 54 contractors; 1 of the 54 contractors had 2 separate episodes ﬁled against it
by multiple claimants) involved more than one worker (not all of whom are part of the random sample) from the same factory.
A total of 356 workers (including 99 workers who are part of the random sample) were involved in the multiple claimant
episodes. The number of workers per multiple claimant episode could be determined in 98 of those 99 claims. Of these 98
claims, the average number of workers per multiple claimant episode was 6.5 workers, and the median was 28 workers.

SINCE AB 633 BECAME LAW, THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP RISE IN THE NUMBERS OF GARMENT WORKERS WHO HAVE FILED WAGE
CLAIMS, BUT THIS INCREASE STILL PALES IN COMPARISON TO THE TENS OF THOUSANDS OF WORKERS WHO HAVE BEEN DEPRIVED
OF THEIR WAGES.
Of the 5833 AB 633 wage claims ﬁled in Southern California107 between March 31, 2001 and March 31, 2004, 83% were ﬁled
in the Los Angeles DLSE ofﬁce.
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THROUGH AB 633’S WAGE GUARANTEE, GARMENT WORKERS ARE STARTING TO RECOVER UNPAID WAGES FROM COMPANIES THAT
USE SWEATSHOPS. THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THESE COMPANIES, HOWEVER, STILL DO NOT PAY A SINGLE PENNY TO
WORKERS, WHO RECEIVE ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF WHAT THEY ARE OWED.

AVERAGE108 RECOVERY PER WORKER

TOTAL RECOVERY

$417

$159,271

$1,365

$283,912

UCLA Preliminary Assessment109 (382 workers)
Our Evaluation (208 workers)

In our evaluation, workers in 157 (76%) of 208 claims, or 129 (79%) of 164 episodes, received money from the contractor and/
or one or more guarantors. Of these:
TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVED BY WORKERS

$283,912

Total Amount Paid by Contractors

$201,182

Total Amount Paid by Guarantors

$ 82,730

Portion of Total Amount Paid by Guarantors that was Paid Pursuant to Settlements

$ 65,782

Only 86 (15%) of 586 guarantors in 39 (34%) of 115 episodes paid any money to workers. It could not be determined whether
the worker received any money or not from 1 guarantor out of 587. Workers who received money from a guarantor(s) may also
have recovered money from the contractor. Guarantors paid workers for the following reasons:

# Guarantors (of 586)
59

Settlement with guarantor only
Joint Settlement between worker, contractor and one or more guarantor(s)

7

Guarantor paid (all or part of) Order110

7

Guarantor paid Order by Settlement111

10

Guarantor paid (all or part of) judgment

3112

Total

86
AGAINST CONTRACTORS
19

20

Issued

14

15

Total

33

35115

# Orders113 Issued
# Orders by Settlement

114

AGAINST GUARANTORS

The total amount of money workers received from contractors and/or guarantors was on average only 31% of initial wages
claimed. The following chart contains data from a set of 160 (80%) out of 200 claims, or 136 (86%) out of 158 episodes, in
which it was possible to determine the initial wages claimed and how much total money the worker received from the contractor
and/or guarantor(s) (including claims in which workers did not receive any money but excluding claims in which workers
voluntarily withdrew their claims).
(OF 160 CLAIMS)

TOTAL AMOUNT $

AVERAGE AMOUNT $

Wages Initially Claimed

$857,274

$5,358

Amount Received From Contractor and/or Guarantor(s)

$267,026

$1,669
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GUARANTORS AND CONTRACTORS LOW-BALL SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS SO WORKERS RECOVER ON AVERAGE ONLY ONE-THIRD OF
WAGES OWED, AND DLSE LETS SOME GUARANTORS COMPLETELY OFF THE HOOK BEFORE ALL WAGES ARE PAID.
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT116

OUR EVALUATION

Total # Claims

382

208

Total # Claims in which worker reached one or more
settlements (with contractor and/or guarantor(s))

108

157117

SETTLEMENTS WITH CONTRACTORS AND/OR GUARANTORS
In 157 (76%) of 208 claims, or 129 (79%) of 164 episodes, workers reached one or more settlements with the contractor and/
or one or more guarantor(s). Of these, for the 155 claims in which it was possible to determine the amount of the settlement(s):
Total settlement amount: $274,679 (97% of $283,912, the total amount received by workers in the random
sample; 34% of $805,662, the total wages initially claimed in these 155 claims)
Average settlement amount/claim: $1,772
SETTLEMENTS WITH CONTRACTORS
Workers in 127 (61%) of 208 claims, or 112 (68%) of 164 episodes, settled with contractors (including 21 joint settlements). Of
these, for the 125 claims in which it was possible to determine the amount paid by contractors (including contractors that paid
$0):
Total settlement amount paid by contractors: $198,611 (only 31% of $646,841, the total wages initially claimed in
these 125 claims)
Average settlement amount/claim paid by contractors: $1,589
SETTLEMENTS WITH GUARANTORS
Workers in 60 (29%) of 208 claims, or 42 (26%) of 164 episodes, entered into settlement agreements (including joint
settlements and Orders by Settlement) with 150 guarantors. For 149 out of these 150 guarantors, it was possible to determine if
and how much guarantors paid:
Total settlement amount paid by guarantors: $65,782 (80% of $82,730, the total amount of money paid by all
guarantors; 16% of $407,153, the total wages initially claimed in these 60 claims)
Average settlement amount/claim paid by guarantors: $442
150 (26%) of the 587 guarantors entered into settlements with workers (including Orders by Settlement and joint settlements).
Of these 150 guarantors that reached settlements with workers:
3, or 2%, settled before a Settlement Conference,
109, or 73%, settled at a Settlement Conference,
13, or 9%, settled after a Settlement Conference, but before a Hearing,
22, or 15%, settled at a Hearing,
1, or 1%, settled after a Hearing, but before an Order was issued, and
2, or 1%, settled after an Order was issued.
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GUARANTORS AND CONTRACTORS LOW-BALL SETTLEMENT AMOUNTS SO WORKERS RECOVER ON AVERAGE ONLY ONE-THIRD OF
WAGES OWED, AND DLSE LETS SOME GUARANTORS COMPLETELY OFF THE HOOK BEFORE ALL WAGES ARE PAID.
DLSE FINDINGS
DLSE issued Findings in 79 (55%) of 145 claims, or 62 (55%) of 112 episodes (in which it could be determined whether or not
DLSE Findings were issued). Of these 79 claims or 62 episodes involving 365 (67%) of 545 guarantors:
186 (51%) of these 365 guarantors, in 61 (77%) of the 79 claims, or 46 (74%) of the 62 episodes, were assessed
liability in DLSE Findings.
Of the 186 guarantors against which DLSE Findings were issued, only 54 (29%) paid workers money. But these 54
guarantors paid over 70% ($60,058 of $82,730) of the total amount of money paid by all guarantors.
Of the total of 86 guarantors who paid workers, 54 (63%) were assessed liability in DLSE Findings.
DLSE FAILS TO IDENTIFY GUARANTORS AND CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATIONS OF GUARANTORS ON A CONSISTENT BASIS,
THUS UNDERMINING THE WAGE GUARANTEE.
IDENTIFICATION OF GUARANTORS
Preliminary Assessment118

Our Evaluation

Claims with one or more guarantor identiﬁed

112 (29%) of 382

125 (60%) of 208

Episodes with one or more guarantor identiﬁed

30 (16%) of 189

91 (56%) of 164

In our evaluation, the number of guarantors identiﬁed per claim ranged from 0 to 17. The average number of guarantors
identiﬁed per claim was 2.8 (of all 208 claims).

METHOD OF INITIAL IDENTIFICATION119
WORKERS INITIALLY IDENTIFIED GUARANTORS BY:
Listing guarantor information on Addendum to Initial Claim form

# Guarantors Identiﬁed
(of all 587 guarantors)
296 (50%) (TOTAL)
115

Providing a (copy of) a label

26

Other methods (e.g., letter from advocate, listing on Initial Claim form)

92

A combination of 2 of the above methods

63

DLSE INITIALLY IDENTIFIED GUARANTORS BY:120

277 (47%) (TOTAL)

Investigations (e.g., BOFE deputy visited factory or guarantor, DLSE asked for information from
contractor and/or guarantor, contractor listed guarantor(s) on DLSE garment registration application,
DLSE Findings mentioned guarantors)

96

Contractors’ responses to DLSE subpoena

17

Notice of Claim or Meet and Confer121
DLSE subpoena sent to guarantor122
CANNOT TELL HOW GUARANTORS WERE IDENTIFIED
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149
15
14 (2%) (TOTAL)

GUARANTORS AND CONTRACTORS FREQUENTLY FAIL TO TURN OVER BUSINESS RECORDS, AND HALF THE TIME DLSE DOES NOT
REQUIRE GUARANTORS TO PRODUCE ANY RECORDS AT ALL.
SUBPOENAS TO CONTRACTORS
DLSE issued subpoenas to contractors in 158 (79%) of 199 claims, or 133 (84%) of 158 episodes (in which it could be
determined whether one had been issued). Of the subset of 147 claims and 127 episodes in which it could be determined
whether or not the contractor provided documents:
Contractors in 29 (20%) of these 147 claims, or 23 (18%) of 127 episodes, provided no documents in response to the
subpoena, even though the claim did not settle near the subpoena response due date, nor did the worker withdraw his/
her claim near the subpoena response due date.123
Contractors in only 76 (52%) of these 147 claims, or 66 (52%) of 127 episodes, provided documents in response to the
subpoena. Documents were incomplete in 67 (88%) of these 76 claims, or 58 (88%) of these 66 episodes.
SUBPOENAS TO GUARANTORS
DLSE issued subpoenas to only 180 (38%) of the 475 guarantors against which it was possible to determine whether or not a
subpoena had been issued (in 64 (46%) of 139 claims, or 52 (49%) of 106 episodes).
Only 98 (54%) of the 180 guarantors that were issued subpoenas provided documents in response (in 47 (73%) of
64 claims, or 40 (77%) of 52 episodes).
SANCTIONS FOR RECORD-KEEPING VIOLATIONS ARE NOT PURSUED BY DLSE, THUS UNDERCUTTING DLSE’S POWER AND
RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE GUARANTORS AND ENFORCE THE WAGE GUARANTEE.
DLSE revoked the garment registration of only 1 contractor in only 1 (1%) of 81 episodes in which it could be determined
whether garment registration revocation would have been an appropriate enforcement action. This contractor’s registration
was revoked for one year because of non-compliance with a DLSE subpoena. This episode involved 20 workers from the same
factory who ﬁled AB 633 claims. ■
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ENDNOTES
The bill was authored by Assembly Member Darrell Steinberg
and co-authored by Senator Tom Hayden during the 19992000 Session. AB 633 is codiﬁed in amendments to California
Labor Code sections 2671, 2675, 2675.5, 2676, 2677, and
2680, and the addition of 2673.1 and 2684, eﬀective January 1,
2000. (All subsequent references to the California Labor Code
are referred to as the “Labor Code.”) 2 Edna Bonacich and
Richard P. Appelbaum, Behind the Label, p. 181 (University of
California Press, 2000) (referred to as Behind the Label); U.S.
Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration,
Wage and Hour Division, “2000 Southern California Garment
Compliance Survey” (Aug. 2000) (referred to as “2000 Garment
Compliance Survey”) (on ﬁle with authors). This amount
was calculated using a method described in Behind the Label:
multiplying average annual back wages owed per garment
factory (updated for the year 2000) by the “estimated [number]
of garment shops in Los Angeles.” 3 California Trade and
Commerce Agency, Oﬃce of Economic Research, “Apparel and
Fashion Design” ( June 2000) (on ﬁle with authors).
4
Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation,
“Los Angeles County Proﬁle” (April 2004) (referred to as “Los
Angeles County Proﬁle”), available at http://www.laedc.org/
data/about_LA_county/la_proﬁle.shtml (last visited Aug. 29,
2005). 5 U.S. Department of Labor, News Release “Only OneThird of Southern California Garment Shops in Compliance
With Federal Labor Laws” (Aug. 25, 2000) (referred to as
“DOL News Release”), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/
media/press/whd/sfwh112.htm (last visited July 28, 2005).
Because federal minimum wage and overtime are lower than
California’s minimum wage and overtime, it is likely that the
rate of violation of minimum wage and overtime laws in
California exceeds 70%, the rate of violation of federal
minimum wage and overtime laws. 6 Behind the Label, p. 2.
7
Sweatshop Watch and Garment Worker Center, “Crisis or
Opportunity? The Future of Los Angeles’ Garment Workers,
the Apparel Industry and the Local Economy,” p. 5 (Nov. 2004)
(referred to as “Crisis or Opportunity?”), citing 2000 U.S.
Census PUMS data. 8 “Poverty Thresholds 2000,” 2000 U.S.
Census (referred to as “Poverty Thresholds 2000”), available at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh00.
html (last visited July 26, 2005). 9 Representing these workers
in a federal lawsuit against the manufacturers and retailers, the
Asian Paciﬁc American Legal Center (APALC) served as lead
counsel, along with co-counsel Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert,
the ACLU of Southern California, Rothner, Segall, Bahan &
Greenstone, Hadsell & Stormer, the Asian Law Caucus, and
the ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project. The lawsuit resulted in
over $4 million in payments to the workers. 10 See endnote 3
above. 11 See endnote 4 above. 12 See endnote 5 above.
13
Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational
Safety and Health, “Garment Survey 2000” (Aug. 25, 2000) (on
ﬁle with authors). 14 Shoddy or non-existent record-keeping
(including failure to keep accurate and complete employee
1

44 · REINFORCING THE SEAMS

payroll records) is part and parcel of worker exploitation in
garment sweatshops because it is easier for factories to violate
wage and hour laws without a paper trail, and harder for
workers to prove their true hours worked and wages owed.
15
Paul M. Ong and Jordan Rickles, “Analysis of the California
Labor and Workforce Development Agency’s Enforcement of
Wage and Hour Laws,” p. 69 (Feb. 2004) (referred to as
“Analysis of Enforcement of Wage and Hour Laws”), available
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1054
&context=lewis (last visited July 28, 2005). 16 See endnote 15
above. 17 Behind the Label, p. 16; Los Angeles County Proﬁle.
18
California Employment Development Department, Industry
Employment Data, Monthly and Annual Average Estimates,
“Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale Metro Div Current
Month Industry Employment with Descriptive Narrative
(Press Release)” ( July 22, 2005), available at http://www.calmis.
ca.gov/ﬁle/lfmonth/la$PDS.pdf (last visited July 28, 2005)
(data is for “apparel manufacturing” employees). 19 According to
the 2000 Census, 70% of garment workers in Los Angeles are
Latino, and 20% are Asian. Roughly 85% of the garment
workforce are women, and 94% are immigrants. Behind the
Label, p. 174. 20 “Crisis or Opportunity?,” p. 4 (based on Census
2000 PUMS data). 21 “Crisis or Opportunity?,” p. 4. 22 Behind
the Label, p. 2. 23 See endnotes 7 and 8 above. 24 The ﬁnal
implementing regulations became eﬀective in October 2002,
nearly three years after the law’s passage. This delay cost the
state millions of dollars because increased registration fees
mandated by AB 633 were not collected – fees that were
intended to fund AB 633’s enforcement. In the period from
October 2002 to May 2005, over $10 million in garment
registration fees were collected. Data from DLSE Licensing
Unit, “Garment Applications and Amounts by Month on or
after 10/9/2002,” Report run on May 17, 2005 (referred to as
“Garment Applications and Amounts Report”) (on ﬁle with
authors). 25 The random sample was generated using SPSS
statistical analysis software and consisted of two runs of 104 out
of 1044 claims. The ﬁndings from this random sample of 208
claims generally have a 5.1% margin of error with a 90%
conﬁdence interval, although the margin of error may vary by
question. 26 Six of the random sample cases were ﬁled by the
workers at DLSE before March 31, 2001, but not docketed
(entered by DLSE in its claim tracking system) until on or after
March 31, 2001. 27 Because most AB 633 claims involve
multiple defendants (i.e., a contractor and one or more
guarantors) whose interests are not always aligned, it is common
for AB 633 claims to conclude at diﬀerent times against
diﬀerent defendants. For example, a guarantor may settle with
the worker shortly after she ﬁles an AB 633 claim, but the
contractor may never settle, which usually results in the claim
proceeding to judgment — a process that may take many
months. In order to give an accurate snapshot of how the AB
633 process works from start to ﬁnish, the random sample was
selected from wage claims in which the claim had concluded
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against each and every defendant. Including open claims in the
random sample would have resulted in the omission of critical
information necessary to inform a reliable understanding of the
AB 633 claims process. 28 Review and analysis of these case ﬁles
was conducted by a team of students and volunteers working
under the supervision of Judy Marblestone, Attorney and Equal
Justice Works Fellow at APALC. 29 Gary Blasi, et al.,
“Implementation of AB 633: A Preliminary Assessment,” p. 4
( July 26, 2001) (referred to as “Preliminary Assessment”),
available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/AB633PreliminaryReport
Draft72601.htm (last visited July 26, 2005). This Preliminary
Assessment is the ﬁrst and only other evaluation of AB 633
conducted since it passed. 30 Episodes involving more than one
worker from the same factory are referred to as “multiple
claimant episodes.” Not all workers in the multiple claimant
episodes are part of the random sample. There are more
episodes than contractors in the random sample because 4
contractors were each involved in 2 separate episodes apiece.
31
See Chapter 3: Methodology for more information about the
random sample. Some comparisons are made in this Chapter to
a Preliminary Assessment of AB 633 conducted by the UCLA
School of Law. The Preliminary Assessment analyzed the
implementation and enforcement of AB 633 during the ﬁrst 15
months of its implementation, from January 2000 to March
2001. See endnote 29 above. 32 Letter dated December 21, 2000
to Assembly Member Gloria Romero from State Labor
Commissioner, Arthur Lujan (on ﬁle with authors).
33
Data from California Labor and Workforce Development
Agency (received June 20, 2005 and July 29, 2005) (on ﬁle with
authors). 34 See endnotes 5 and 18 above. 35 Comparison data for
the ﬁrst 15 months of implementation was taken from the
Preliminary Assessment, p. 3. See endnote 29 above. Amounts
were recovered from settlements or Order, Decision, or Awards
(referred to in our evaluation as “Orders”). Average amount
recovered could not be assessed against average amount claimed
because this data was not available in the Preliminary
Assessment. In the Preliminary Assessment, the median
amount claimed per worker was $920. In our evaluation, the
median amount claimed per worker was $1553. 36 An Order
results from a full administrative hearing and includes a
statement of facts, explanation of the law, and the reasoning
behind the Order award. Orders diﬀer from “Orders by
Settlement,” which are issued when claims settle at the hearing,
but before any evidence or testimony is introduced. 37 This
amount was paid by 86 guarantors, and includes payments
resulting from settlements, Orders, and judgments. 38 This was
calculated from the set of 20 guarantors against which Orders
were issued; 8 of 20 guarantors paid the Order and paid it in
full. 39 Comparison data for the ﬁrst 15 months of
implementation was taken from the Preliminary Assessment,
pp. 3, 6. See endnote 29 above. 40 Settlements include Orders by
Settlement (issued when settlements are reached at the hearing,

but prior to the presentation of evidence by any party) and joint
settlements (settlements between the worker, the contractor, and
one or more guarantors; settlement payments come from one or
more of these defendants who are parties to the joint
settlement). 41 All names of garment workers in this and
subsequent Case Studies of this report have been changed to
maintain worker anonymity. Technical terms referencing
various aspects of the AB 633 claims process are deﬁned in
Overview of AB 633 Claims Process, p.16. 42 This percentage
was derived from analyzing aggregate wages for all workers in
the random sample; some individual workers received less than
31% of their wages initially claimed, some received more. 43 This
average was calculated from a set of 352 guarantors, which
included guarantors that were potentially liable for the worker’s
wages but paid no money to the worker. This set excluded (a)
guarantors against which the worker voluntarily withdrew or
abandoned his or her claim; and (b) guarantors in claims where
workers had already received all of his or her wages claimed,
thus eliminating any potential liability for remaining guarantors.
44
This was calculated from the set of 20 guarantors against
which Orders were issued; 12 of 20 guarantors paid nothing.
Our evaluation also found that only 1 of 19 contractors paid
workers as a result of an Order. This ﬁnding further underscores
the need to fully enforce the wage guarantee. 45 For 2 of these
judgments, DLSE collected only a small portion (just over 5%)
of the judgment amount. 46 Pseudonym. 47 See Labor Code
sections 98.2(i) and 98.3 (a). 48 See California Revenue and
Taxation Code section 19290 (referred to as “Revenue and
Taxation Code”). 49 California State Auditor, “Franchise Tax
Board: Signiﬁcant Program Changes Are Needed to Improve
Collections of Delinquent Labor Claims,” pp. 1, 13 (May 2004)
(referred to as “FTB Report 2004”), available at http://www.
bsa.ca.gov/bsa/pdfs/2003-131.pdf (last visited July 27, 2005).
The FTB is authorized to collect the delinquent “fees, wages,
penalties, costs, and interest (claims) that result from labor law
violations by California employers,” including violations of AB
633. An analysis of claims referred to the FTB in 2001-2003
showed that the FTB collected full or partial payment on only
20% of these claims. 50 FTB Report 2004, pp. 18-19. 51 FTB
Report 2004, p.13 (based on a sample of 60 claims). 52 FTB
Report 2004, p. 18. 53 For the purposes of this report, a joint
settlement is one between a worker, the contractor, and one or
more guarantors. Workers entered into joint settlements in 21
(10%) of the 208 claims in our evaluation. 54 This is particularly
true when considering the abysmal rate of recovery on Orders
even when workers prevail at a hearing. See endnote 44. 55 This
percentage was derived from comparing aggregate wages
received and claimed by all workers in the random sample for
whom wage data was available; some individual workers
received less than this percentage of their wages initially
claimed, some received more. 56 See endnote 55. 57 See endnote
55. 58 Multiple guarantors are typically involved in each AB 633
claim. The average number of guarantors identiﬁed per claim in
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our evaluation was 2.8. 59 Pseudonyms. 60 See Labor Code
section 2675.5. 61 See Labor Code section 2673.1(d)(3). When
more than one guarantor is identiﬁed, DLSE must determine
each guarantor’s share of liability. The average number of
guarantors identiﬁed per claim in our evaluation was 2.8.
62
In our evaluation, we determined that a guarantor was
“identiﬁed” if DLSE had taken some step to notify the
guarantor of its potential liability, including any of the
following: sending a notice of the claim and settlement
conference, sending a subpoena, assessing liability in a Findings
and Assessment (referred to in our evaluation as “DLSE
Findings”), holding a hearing, and/or issuing an Order. 63 It is
helpful to analyze guarantor identiﬁcation by episode in order
not to overstate the data. See Chapter 3: Methodology.
Workers from the same factory who ﬁle wage claims together,
or around the same time, often work on clothing for the same
guarantors; if each guarantor were counted once per claim ﬁled
by each worker, the number of guarantors identiﬁed would be
artiﬁcially inﬂated due to duplicative counts. 64 Comparison data
for the ﬁrst 15 months of implementation was taken from the
Preliminary Assessment, pp. 4-5. See endnote 29 above. In the
Preliminary Assessment, a guarantor was “identiﬁed” if the
guarantor was entered into DLSE’s computer tracking system,
signifying that some step had been taken to notify the guarantor
of its potential liability. 65 See Appendix B for detailed data.
It is commendable that DLSE seeks information from workers
about guarantors. However, DLSE’s over-reliance on workers
for information neglects DLSE’s independent obligation to
conduct adequate investigations. In our evaluation, we
determined that workers identiﬁed guarantors by submitting
labels of clothes they made at the contract shop; submitting lists
of guarantor names via advocates who were representing them
in their claims; and/or listing the guarantors or their associated
clothing labels on DLSE’s “Addendum” form as part of ﬁling
the initial claim. It is likely that workers verbally identiﬁed
additional guarantors to DLSE investigators, but this method of
identiﬁcation by workers was not possible to discern from a
manual review of the case ﬁles. Presumably, any instances in
which guarantors were initially identiﬁed through worker
testimony have been subsumed under other methods of
identiﬁcation otherwise attributable to DLSE’s identiﬁcation of
guarantors. 66 See Labor Code section 2673.1 (d)(3). 67 Over
70% of the 150 settlements entered into by guarantors occurred
at the “Meet-and-Confer” settlement conference (referred to in
our evaluation as the “Settlement Conference”), when DLSE
Findings were issued. Guarantors who were assessed liability in
DLSE Findings were more likely to pay workers. Over 60% of
the 86 guarantors who paid workers were assessed liability in
DLSE Findings. 68 Pseudonym. 69 This data may include
guarantors DLSE could not locate, but this was not possible to
determine since no indication to that eﬀect was written in the
case ﬁle; it does not include guarantors against which workers
voluntarily withdrew or abandoned their claims. 70 Pseudonym.
71
See Labor Code section 2673.1(d)(1). 72 See California Code
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of Regulations section 13659 (a) and (b) (referred to as “Code
of Regulations”). 73 See Code of Regulations section 13659 (c).
74
Incomplete payroll records are used to cover up wage and
hour violations. In addition, payroll records are manipulated in
a variety of ways to cheat workers out of the wages they are
owed. For example, many garment workers are forced to work
“oﬀ-the-clock”: to punch their time cards well after they have
started working, and to punch out long before they stop
working. Time cards are routinely doctored to reﬂect fewer
hours than are actually worked, and workers are then required to
sign falsiﬁed time cards in order to get paid. Documents
indicating piece rate production are also routinely doctored to
indicate fewer pieces than are actually sewn. Pay stubs are
routinely falsiﬁed to indicate higher wage rates than are actually
paid to workers. 75 This data was analyzed from the subsets of
episodes in which it could be determined whether or not DLSE
had issued a subpoena to the contractor and whether or not
documents were provided. See Appendix B for detailed
explanation of data. Episodes in which contractors did not
provide any documents in response to the subpoena were
excluded from our analysis if the claim settled shortly
(approximately one month) after the subpoena response due
date, if the worker withdrew his/her claim, or if the contractor
could not be located to issue the subpoena. It is helpful to
analyze subpoena compliance by episode in order not to overstate
the data; if subpoena compliance were analyzed per claim ﬁled
by each worker, the compliance rate would be artiﬁcially inﬂated
due to duplicative counts in cases where multiple workers ﬁled
claims against the same contractor. 76 No DLSE case ﬁles
contained a written contract submitted by a contractor, nor any
itemized wage deduction statements listing guarantor names.
It is possible that such documents were submitted to the Bureau
of Field Enforcement (BOFE) and are maintained in separate
ﬁles to which we did not have access. 77 This data was analyzed
from the subsets of episodes in which it could be determined
whether or not DLSE had issued a subpoena to the guarantor
and whether or not documents were provided. See Appendix B
for detailed explanation of data. 78 Of the 98 guarantors that
provided documents, nine provided copies of a written contract.
It is possible that written contracts for an additional number of
guarantors were submitted to the Bureau of Field Enforcement
(BOFE) and are maintained in separate ﬁles to which we did
not have access. 79 See Labor Code section 2673.1(d)(1) and
2675; Code of Regulations section 13659 (b) and (c). 80 Workers
in less than half of the claims participated in Settlement
Conferences. Hearings were held in only 17% of the claims.
81
See Labor Code sections 2674.2 and 2675.5. 82 Garment
Applications and Amounts Report. 83 It is possible that a
portion of this amount is being deposited into the Garment
Special Fund to pay workers who cannot collect wages owed
from contractors and/or guarantors. See Labor Code section
2675.5. 84 Interviews with DLSE staﬀ informed a number of
these recommendations. 85 See Labor Code sections 98.2(i) and
98.3(a). 86 See Labor Code section 2678 (a)(1). 87 See Code of
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Regulations section 13659 (c). 88 See Code of Regulations
section 13659 (a) and (b); Labor Code section 2673 (e). 89 See
“DLSE Garment manufacturers and contractors registration
database,” available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/databases/dlselr/
Garmreg.html (last visited July 26, 2005). 90 These requirements
mirror those mandated under California Code of Civil
Procedure section 2031.230. 91 See Code of Regulations section
13655. 92 See Labor Code sections 2673 and 2678 (a)(3).
93
See Labor Code section 2673.1(e). 94 See Code of Regulations
section 13659 (a) and (b). 95 See Labor Code section
2673.1(d)(1). 96 See Code of Regulations section 13659 (c).
97
See Code of Regulations section 13632. 98 See Labor Code
sections 2671 and 2673.1. 99 See Labor Code section 2673.1.
100
See Code of Regulations section 13659. 101 See Labor Code
section 2673.1 (d)(1). 102 See Code of Regulations section 13659
(c). 103 See Labor Code section 2675.5 and Code of Regulations
section 13635. 104 See Labor Code section 2684. 105 Six of the
random sample cases were ﬁled by the workers at DLSE before
March 31, 2001, but not docketed (entered by DLSE in its
claim tracking system) until on or after March 31, 2001, which
is why they are included in the random sample. 106 There are
no cases in 2004, because the random sample includes only
claims docketed against the ﬁrst defendant between Jan. 1,
2004 and Feb. 18, 2004 and none of these claims were closed
for all defendants based on data provided by DLSE on April
6, 2004. 107 Southern California includes the Los Angeles,
Long Beach, Santa Ana, and Van Nuys DLSE oﬃces. 108 Both
averages are calculated using the total number of workers in
each Assessment (382 in the Preliminary Assessment and 208
in our Evaluation). Thus, the averages are probably slightly
lower than they should be because they include claims in which
workers received no money because they voluntarily withdrew
their wage claims, thus relieving defendants of any potential
legal responsibility to pay. The average recovery per worker in
our Evaluation rises to $1,669 if it is calculated from the set of
160 claims in which the worker did not voluntarily withdraw
or abandon his or her claim (comparable data is not available
for the Preliminary Assessment). 109 Preliminary Assessment,
p. 4. See endnote 29 above. 110 An “Order” results from a full
administrative hearing. Such Orders include a statement of
facts, explanation of the law, and the reasoning behind the
Order award. 111 “Orders by Settlement” are issued when claims
settle at the hearing, but before any evidence, testimony, etc. is
introduced. Defendants who enter Orders by Settlement waive
their right to a full administrative hearing. If they do not pay
the Order by Settlement amount, then the Order by Settlement
will be entered as a ﬁnal judgment. 112 One of these judgments
was paid in satisfaction of an Order and 2 judgments were paid
in satisfaction of Orders by Settlement. 113 See endnote 110
above. 114 See endnote 111 above. 115 An additional 4 Orders
which were issued in favor of guarantors (i.e., guarantors were

not found liable) are not included here. 116 See endnote 29 above.
117
Settlements include negotiated settlements reached prior to a
hearing, as well as Orders by Settlement (settlements reached at
the hearing). 118 Preliminary Assessment, pp. 4-5. See endnote
29 above. 119 Initial identiﬁcation was determined by locating
the document in each case ﬁle with the earliest date on which
the guarantor’s name appeared. 120 The number of guarantors
whose initial identiﬁcation is attributed to DLSE may be
inﬂated because workers may have initially identiﬁed some of
these guarantors, told DLSE which labels they worked on, and
then DLSE followed-up on the worker testimony. However,
it was impossible to determine this information from the case
ﬁles, so such initial identiﬁcation is attributed to DLSE.
121
For guarantors that were mentioned for the ﬁrst time on the
Notice, it is unclear exactly how they were identiﬁed so such
identiﬁcation is attributed to DLSE. 122 DLSE sent subpoenas
to 180 guarantors. However, the number in this chart is much
lower because it signiﬁes guarantors that were initially identiﬁed
(ﬁrst mentioned in the case ﬁle) through the subpoena
(as opposed to, e.g., guarantors that were ﬁrst identiﬁed by
workers and then DLSE sent a subpoena). 123 Claims in which
contractors did not provide any documents in response to the
subpoena were excluded if the claim settled shortly (up to
approximately one month) after the subpoena response due
date, if the worker withdrew his/her claim, or if the contractor
could not be located to issue the subpoena.
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